



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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Mr. Leslie Gelb
THE NEW YORK TIMES
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036


Dear Les:

Re your article in the 2 June NEW YORK TIMES, attached is a chronology of publicized intelligence on the so-called "Libyan bombing." As is obvious, President Reagan was not, as you and other journalists have asserted, the original source of information on this subject. The media have misled the American people on this matter.

Secondly, you assert that, "In late 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency made a determined effort to tell reporters details about their interrogation of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a key Soviet intelligence agent who apparently defected and then slipped out of American control and returned to Moscow. The CIA told its side, as some of its officials acknowledged at the time, to show that he had been a valuable informer, contrary to White House assertions of his uselessness."

The fact is that CIA said nothing at all about Yurchenko in other than classified hearings or meetings until he redefected. I don't understand what you are getting at. Enlighten me.

Sincerely,

A 
George V. Lauder

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But "when Henry became Secretary of State, I recommended that he deal with the press as a whole, not individually," he added. "He didn't agree and went on seeing people individually."

Officials in the Nixon White House did not take such a detached view of Mr. Kissinger's "individual" contacts with reporters, much of which they contended was directed against them.

The current batch of disclosures causing so much consternation in the Reagan Administration concerns two things: the reputed passing of sensitive communications intelligence by an American to the Soviet Union, and the interception of messages between Libya and its diplomatic posts overseas prior to and just after the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discothèque.

Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, was asked today why news articles about the secrets reportedly already given to Moscow were more damaging to national security than Mr. Reagan's own public statement about the United States intercepting the Libyan messages.

Mr. Speakes responded: "The scope and the impact of it is entirely different. Also, the fact that it was a carefully considered decision here to release the Libyan information, what of it we did, and it was a judgmental call that we made to declassify that information."

But, a reporter persisted, was not the C.I.A. concerned about the decision to release the Libyan information?

"Well, I think those type of discussions were held," Mr. Speakes responded. "But the final determination was that it was in the national interest to provide the information to the public."
